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(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism 
a Hybrid View?
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INTRODUCTION
Mainline metaethical expressivists of the 1960s through the 1990s generally 
conceived of expressivism as a view in philosophical semantics. Roughly speak-
ing, the idea is that the meaning of ethical sentences is to be given not in terms 
of what they represent or describe but rather in terms of the noncognitive atti-
tudes they express.1 But if this idea is combined with the traditional thought 
that the meanings of most other declarative sentences are given by the proposi-
tions they express, then it turns out to be impossible to give a systematic seman-
tics for logically complex sentences with mixed ethical and nonethical parts.2 
In response many expressivists have endorsed an “ideationalist” conception of 
meaning across the board. That is, they suggest that all sentences mean what 
1. It is not obvious that this was how protoexpressivists like A. J. Ayer (1946), Rudolf Carnap 
(1935), and Charles L. Stevenson (1937, 1944) thought of the view. However, under the influ-
ence of R. M. Hare (1952, 1963), who treated ethical sentences semantically as prescriptions 
and sought to align satisfaction conditions with ethical sentences as one might align truth 
conditions with descriptive sentences, the view became a semantic one. Many contempo-
rary expressivists are quite explicit in locating (the expression of) conative attitudes in the 
semantics of ethical terms or sentences. See, for example, Gibbard 2003, 75. Even expres-
sivism’s most prominent critics typically conceive it as a semantic view. See, for example, 
Jackson2001,10; Schroeder 2008, 87.
2. This we take to be the main upshot of P. T. Geach’s seminal 1965 paper.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon May 26 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199347582.indd   223 5/26/2014   1:13:18 PM
224 H AV I N G  I T  B O T H  WAY S
they do in virtue of the “idea” (mental state type) they express; it is just that 
ethical sentences express a different kind of mental state from descriptive sen-
tences.3 Recently, a further epicycle of this debate has seen the articulation of 
various “hybrid” views that in some way seek to get the best of both views that 
ethical sentences express conative attitudes and that ethical sentences express 
beliefs by giving the meaning of ethical sentences in terms of both cognitive 
and conative states.4
We find the initial ideationalist thought and its development in some hybrid 
views rather odd.5 The main source of our puzzlement is that we find it odd 
to say that sentences—ethical or not—are in the business of expressing mental 
state types (whether cognitive, conative-motivational, or some suitable hybrid). 
We think the more natural and conservative idea is that sentences express 
propositions. At least this is often seen as the neutral framework in which to 
investigate how sentences are semantically composed and what it takes for 
good translations of a sentence in one language into other languages. Moreover, 
independently of metaethics we would be inclined to say that it is acts of mak-
ing claims that express various mental states (or better, that it is people making 
the claims who express their mental states). Appreciating these points in the 
context of trying to capture some special internal connection between ethi-
cal claims and motivation leads, we think, to something reasonably regarded 
3. For a recent exposition of this idea, see Richard forthcoming.
4. It is important to note that, regardless of the innovations “hybrid” views purport to add to 
ethical expressivism, they nonetheless have tended to persist in conceiving of expressivism 
as first and foremost a take on the semantic content of ethical claims. According to Daniel 
Boisvert’s “Expressive-Assertivism” (2008), for instance, the claim “Tormenting the cat is 
bad” expresses both the belief that tormenting the cat has a certain (non-speaker-relative) 
property and a negative attitude toward things with that property. The claim therefore has 
the following meaning, according to Boisvert(2008, 172):  “Tormenting the cat is F; boo 
for things that are F!” Likewise, MichaelRidge (2007, 63) once described his “Ecumenical 
Expressivism” as “offering a systematic and unified semantics for both asserted and unas-
serted uses of normative predicates” (italics added; see also Ridge 2006). (Though more 
recently Ridge [2014] has moved to casting his hybrid expressivism as a view in metaseman-
tics, i.e., as a view about that in virtue of which claims have the semantic contents that they 
have. See Chrisman 2014 for an argument that expressivism as a metasemantic thesis is both 
a better version of expressivism and a plausible interpretation of the kind of quasi-realist 
proposal made in Blackburn 1984).
5. It is especially odd in light of the widely received view among philosophers of language 
that the contemporary paradigm of ideationalist semantics, understood as a theory of mean-
ing for natural language—Grice’s theory—faces insurmountable difficulties. (For an attempt 
to develop a Gricean semantic theory that overcomes these difficulties, see Davis 2003.) 
For an alternative way of construing Grice’s proposal (which is, however, consistent with a 
non-Gricean, propositionalist semantics), see Bar-On 1995.
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as a hybrid expressivist view. But it is a view that—if it hybridizes anything—
hybridizes the notion of expression rather than the types of mental state seman-
tically expressed by ethical sentences. This is the view that two of us previously 
defended under the label “ethical neo-expressivism.”6
According to this view, (declarative) ethical sentences do have propositions as 
their semantic contents—in this they are like any other (declarative) sentence. 
However, it is acts of making an ethical claim that are properly said to express 
mental states, and they do so “directly” rather than by expressing somehow 
the proposition that one is in a particular mental state. Accordingly, the previ-
ous paper argues for two claims:  (i)  there are two different but antecedently 
quite plausible notions of expression, called s-expression (for “semantic”) and 
a-expression (for “action”);7 (ii) if one wishes to capture a special internal con-
nection between ethical claims and motivation in a way that accommodates 
the logico-semantic behavior of ethical sentences, it is best to articulate the 
idea that ethical claims express motivational attitudes in terms of the notion of 
a-expression rather than the notion of s-expression.
This raises two important questions:
propositions was that propositions determine truth conditions, which 
are thought to be ways the world could be; so if we reject all analyses 
of ethical terms in terms of natural properties, is not anyone who says 
that ethical sentences express propositions (e.g., the neo-expressivist) 
committed to the Moorean conclusion that ethical sentences describe 
sui generis “nonnatural” ways the world could be?
part of the literal or implicated meaning of ethical sentences, are we not 
committed to denying the intuition behind motivational internalism 
after all? (Or another way of putting it: is not a-expression unsuitable 
for capturing internalism?)
We want to use this chapter as an occasion to return to some of the main ideas 
in “Ethical Neo-Expressivism” in light of these questions. In particular we want 
to explain in more detail the way ethical neo-expressivism adopts an appealing, 
metaphysically neutral framework within which to think about the semantics 
of ethical sentences. In addition we want to flesh out the notion of a-expression, 
explaining why we see it as more basic and more relevant to issues in metaethics 
6. In Bar-On and Chrisman 2009.
7. The distinction takes its inspiration from Sellars 1969.
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than anything having to do with expressing or conveying the proposition that 
one is in a particular mental state. This will also put us in a position to address 
a number of critical questions we have encountered.
A PLEA FOR CONSERVATISM IN SEMANTICS
Independently of any metaethical debate, it is natural to say of any declarative 
sentence “S” that it expresses the proposition that-S (bracketing the subtle but 
at present irrelevant issues about context sensitivity). The idea of a sentence 
expressing a proposition provides an attractive framework for beginning to 
think about the literal meaning of sentences and several related issues.8 This is 
for at least the following connected reasons, all of which have been traditionally 
invoked in support of the need for invoking propositions.
First, the literal meaning of a sentence is surely preserved in a good transla-
tion of that sentence into another language. This is why it is natural to say that 
a sentence S1 in one language is a good translation of another sentence S2 in 
another language only if S1 and S2 express the same proposition. Expressing 
the same proposition may in some cases not be sufficient for good translation, 
but it is at least necessary.9 So, for example, good translation cannot be achieved 
by simply preserving truthconditions. Clearly, two sentences can have the same 
truthconditions and not be good translations of one another.
Second, a declarative sentence type can be tokened on its own in making 
an assertion, but it can also be tokened alongside other semantic elements or 
embedded in various sentential contexts, and we need some generic way to 
keep track of the commonality of content across different contexts. For exam-
ple, the sentence “It is raining” can be used to make an assertion, but it can 
also occur as the antecedent of a conditional or be appended to an epistemic 
modal—namely, “If it’s raining, then I’ll take an umbrella” and “It might be 
raining.” What do all of these tokens of the sentence type “It’s raining” have in 
8. The notion of “proposition” we have in mind here is the ontologically neutral notion 
of locutionary content rather than the more specific and ontologically committal Fregean 
notion (viz., a Platonic object in a “third realm”). In a model theoretical context it might be 
represented as a function from the worlds postulated in a semantic model to truth values (or 
by some more complex function or set-theoretical object). In our view, whether using such 
theoretical models commits one ontologically is a further question beyond the question of 
whether such models are useful for understanding various compositional phenomena of the 
semantics of a language.
9. Though see Bar-On 1993 for some qualifications and complications that do not bear on 
the issues of concern to us here.
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common? It may not tell us much, but it surely provides a convenient frame-
work to say that they all share propositional content.
Third, declarative sentences can be used to articulate the object of various 
attitudes. For example, you may suspect that it is sunny in Edinburgh, and 
I might hope that it is sunny in Edinburgh, in which case the sentence “It is 
sunny in Edinburgh” articulates what you suspect and what I hope. How does it 
do that? The straightforward answer is that it does that by expressing the propo-
sition that it is sunny in Edinburgh, which is the object of both your suspicion 
and my hope.10
Now consider ethical sentences like “Charity is good,”“Not giving to charity 
is wrong,” and “Middle-class citizens are obligated to give to charity.” Should we 
say that these sentences also express propositions? Well, as far as syntax goes, 
these sentences are surely declarative sentences, and we can easily produce non-
ethical sentences that would appear to have exactly the same logical form: for 
example, “Charity is common,”“Not giving to charity is legal,”“Middle-class 
citizens are likely to give to charity.” This suggests that like the nonethical sen-
tences, the ethical sentences fall under the generalization mentioned above 
that, for any declarative sentence “S,”“S” expresses the proposition that-S 
(again, bracketing context sensitivity). Moreover, ethical sentences in one lan-
guage seem to admit of good translations into other languages just as much as 
nonethical sentences. So insofar as natural criteria for good translation deploy 
the notion of two sentences expressing the same proposition, we will want 
that notion to apply in the ethical case just as much as in the nonethical case. 
Likewise, it seems that ethical sentences can function just like nonethical sen-
tences in semantic embeddings and to articulate the objects of diverse attitudes. 
We can say, for instance, “Not giving to charity is wrong” but also “If not giving 
to charity is wrong, then I’ll endeavor to give to charity” or “Not giving to char-
ity might be wrong.” Similarly, it seems that you may suspect that middle-class 
10. It does not seem plausible to us to suggest that the sentence “It’s raining” expresses the 
belief (type) that it is raining without expressing the belief (token) of any particular indi-
vidual. What is in common among attitude ascriptions like (i) John believes that it’s raining, 
(ii) John hopes that it’s raining, (iii) John fears that it’s raining, (iv) John doubts that it’s rain-
ing, and (v) John suspects that it’s raining, it seems, is some content and not a type of belief 
(or any other attitude) with that content. (Moreover, one might wonder: why single out belief 
as the relevant type of attitude that is held constant across attitudes?) What one wants is a 
notion of content that is attitude neutral, one that abstracts away from attitude type (as well 
as, relatedly, abstracting from speech-act type)—precisely something like the conventional 
notion of a proposition understood as Austinian locutionary content or a Fregean thought 
(minus the Platonist ontological commitment). (Thanks here to Dean Pettit.) It is revealing 
that philosophers otherwise drawn to “mentalist” conceptions of meaning have nonetheless 
found reason to resort to essentially abstract and so in that sense nonmental notions of con-
tent (for recent examples, see Davis 2003; Soames 2010).
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citizens are obligated to give to charity, while I doubt that middle-class citizens 
are obligated to give to charity, in which case the sentence “Middle-class citi-
zens are obligated to give to charity” is a pretty good way to articulate what you 
suspect and what I doubt. Again, the straightforward account of how it does 
this is that this sentence expresses the proposition that middle-class citizens are 
obligated to give to charity.
Does not all of this speak strongly in favor of treating declarative ethical 
sentences just as we treat declarative nonethical sentences, in terms of their 
expressing propositions? Obviously, yes. But to be clear, we do not view a posi-
tive answer to this question as the end of philosophical semantics but rather as 
the insistence on working within a relatively neutral framework when it comes 
to the metaphysics and psychology of particular areas of discourse and for 
beginning to think more systematically about the literal meaning of declarative 
sentences of whatever category. There will surely remain interesting questions 
in semantic theory about how various syntactic, contextual, and logical factors 
contribute systematically to the propositions expressed by various sentences. 
There will still be questions about what semantic contribution is made by rel-
evant subsentential components. There will also remain interesting questions in 
developmental linguistics/psychology about how beings like us acquire compe-
tence with the literal meanings of the relevant sentences and their components. 
Moreover, there may be further interesting questions in the metaphysics of 
semantics regarding what (if anything) a literal meaning is (abstract/concrete, 
structured/unstructured, external/internal, etc.). Pursuing these further ques-
tions is perfectly consistent with the idea that declarative sentences, including 
those with ethical content, express propositions.11
Note that, on the conservative approach to theorizing about the meanings 
of ethical sentences that we are recommending, there is no expectation that it 
should be possible to provide a meaning analysis of ordinary declarative sen-
tences by paraphrasing them in other terms. A long history of failures in areas 
other than ethics to give paraphrases of sentences containing simple terms 
and analyses of atomic concepts should make us leery of any attempt to para-
phrase sentences containing ethical terms in other terms (normative or not). 
Ethical sentences are not unique in this regard. According to the semantic 
conservatism we advocate, the unavailability of such paraphrastic analyses in 
the ethical case is not by itself indicative of some elusive “is-ought” gap but 
11. Huw Price (1994; 2013,chap. 1) defends a view he calls “semantic minimalism” that we 
find congenial, but we do not think (as he does) that it supports global nonfactualism. The 
framework Price offers—in contrast to ethical neo-expressivism—is not designed to address, 
specifically, the motivational asymmetry between ethical and nonethical discourse. We leave 
discussion of this and other differences for another occasion.
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rather of the more general fact that meaningfulness does not require the avail-
ability of paraphrastic analysis. Nor do we need to suppose that the acquisition 
and competent use of such terms involves mastery of paraphrastic analyses. 
Sentences mean what they do in virtue of expressing propositions, and in 
many cases the propositions they express can be specified disquotationally, 
at least when the object language and the language in which the meaning is 
specified are the same. “John loves Mary” expresses the proposition that John 
loves Mary. And it is no different with ethical sentences: “Tormenting the cat 
is wrong” expresses the proposition that tormenting the cat is wrong. Thus the 
semantic conservatism we adopt allows us to be semantically neutral in the 
sense of not being committed to the availability of a reductive meaning analy-
sis for ethical terms and sentences. In general we think that ordinary declara-
tive sentences S can be said to express the proposition that-S, and this includes 
declarative sentences with ethical content.12 Of course a full compositional 
semantics must say much more about how the parts of ordinary declarative 
sentences interact to determine the proposition expressed, which will involve 
more than simple disquotation. But the view that declarative sentences express 
propositions that can be initially specified disquotationally comports with the 
most neutral framework for thinking about the compositional possibilities for 
ethical and nonethical terms and sentences.13
All in all we think there are good linguistic reasons not to make any spe-
cial pleading for ethical sentences (or even normative sentences more gener-
ally). Such sentences do not constitute a distinct semantic category, that is, one 
deserving a radically different treatment from other kinds of sentences, simply 
in virtue of containing ethical terms. (Specifically, there is nothing in the ordi-
nary use of these sentences that marks them as disguised nondeclaratives and 
thus as diverging in their linguistic behavior from declarative sentences that 
are plausibly taken to have propositional meaning. On the contrary.) Given 
the similarities in linguistic behavior between ethical and nonethical terms 
and given that ethical terms embed seamlessly in “mixed” contexts as well as 
figuring in various nonethical contexts, we ought to prefer adopting the same 
basic semantic framework for all declarative sentences, ethical or not. And for 
reasons articulated above, we think the propositionalist framework is a good 
12. Note that this is consistent with maintaining that meaningfulness requires much more 
than the mere possibility of disquotation or syntactic wellformedness.
13. See Chrisman 2012 and Pettit 2010 for suggestions along these lines with respect to par-
ticular terms. The key point is to deny that semantic analysis must, e.g., result in an analytic 
paraphrase of some sort, involving lexical decomposition of the relevant terms, or spell out 
(nondisquotationally) necessary and sufficient conditions.
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place to start. (We note in passing that there is additional linguistic support 
for taking the link between descriptiveness and embedability—and the requi-
site notion of propositionality—to be relatively superficial. For many sentences 
that are uncontroversially used (at least in part) to make genuinely descriptive 
claims—for example, “What a loyal friend you are”—cannot be embedded in 
conditionals; “If what a loyal friend you are, then I can trust you” seems no less 
illformed than “If Loyal friend! then I can trust you.”)
So what has motivated expressivists of many different stripes to depart from 
propositional semantics and undertake wholesale semantic revisionism? In the 
main they have assumed this to be the only plausible way to accomplish two 
important things expressivism is intended to accomplish:
(a) Avoid commitment to “spooky” irreducibly normative facts
(b) Capture the “internal” connection between ethical claims and 
motivation
Re (a): Another traditional role assigned to propositions—one we have not 
mentioned above—is being bearers of truth value. Given that and given an 
assumed connection between a sentence being truth evaluable and it serving 
to describe “the way the world is,” it might be thought that, if one concedes that 
an ethical sentence “S” expresses the proposition that-S, then the only way one 
could be an antirealist would be to endorse some kind of unpalatable ethical 
error theory or fictionalism.14 Re (b): One of the key virtues of expressivism is 
supposed to be that it accommodates the motivational internalist’s claim of a 
close connection between sincere ethical claims and motivation to act. But to 
do so, it is thought, one must build the relevant motivational attitudes into the 
meanings of ethical sentences.
However, we view the propositionalist framework we recommend as allowing 
one to be neutral on the metaphysical issue underlying (a) above—and neutral 
in a way that accommodates antirealism. (See the fourth section of the chapter.) 
Moreover, as regards (b) above, we think that whatever “internal” connection 
there may be between ethical discourse and motivation, it should be captured 
not through the semantic content of ethical sentences—what sentences express, 
semantically speaking—but rather through what speakers (or thinkers) express 
in acts of ethical claim making. In what follows we take a step back and explain 
more carefully how we think of these two different expression relations and 
how they figure in defusing the motivations provided by (a) and (b) for expres-
sivists to depart from standard propositionalist semantics. This puts us in a 
14. See, e.g., Kalderon 2005; Mackie 1977.
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position to offer anyone moved by desiderata (a)  and (b)  new resources for 
meeting them without going in for anything like an expressivist semantics for 
ethical sentences.
A-EXPRESSION VERSUS S-EXPRESSION
The class of behaviors ordinarily described as “expressive” spans a wide range.15 
At one end of the spectrum, we have so-called natural expressions—yelps, gri-
maces, and various gestures—where both the behavior and its connection to 
the expressed states are supposed to be inculcated by nature. There are also 
mimicked or acquired facial expressions or gestures that become “second 
nature,” such as shrugging shoulders or tut-tutting. Then we have conventional 
nonverbal expressions, such as tipping one’s hat or sticking out one’s tongue. 
(The line here is not sharp; giving a hug, jumping for joy, stomping your feet, for 
example, all seem to fall somewhere in between, exhibiting both “natural” and 
acquired elements.) Still in the conventional realm, we have expressive verbal 
utterances, such as “Darn it!”“Ouch!”“Sorry!”“This is great!”“I hate you!” and 
so on. We also find in the verbal domain utterances such as “There’s a crow on 
the telephone pole,” which (if sincere) expresses a speaker’s present belief, or 
“Let it rain,” which expresses the speaker’s wish for rain. Finally, at the far end 
of the conventional side of the spectrum, we have speech acts, such as assertion 
or promising, which are alleged to have the expression of certain mental states 
as part of their felicity conditions.16
Still, we can discern the following commonality among the expressive 
behaviors mentioned so far: they all express states of minds, as opposed to, say, 
propositions, concepts, or ideas. This is why we follow Wilfrid Sellars (1969) in 
conceiving of this kind of expression as a relation that holds between performers 
of acts and the mental states these acts directly express—“a-expression”—and 
contrast this with the relation that holds between meaningful strings (e.g., sen-
tence tokens) and their semantic contents. As we are thinking of it, a-expression 
is something a minded creature does, be it through bodily demeanor, facial 
expression or gesture, or speech, using a natural, conventional, and even idio-
syncratic expressive vehicle.
Thus, for example, we say that the sentence “Snow is white” s-expresses the 
proposition that snow is white, and we say that the word “justice” s-expresses 
the abstract concept of justice. On the other hand, your dog, when he or she 
15. Parts of the present section overlap with Bar-On forthcoming.
16. See Green 2007, 140–143.
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gets up and walks over to give you a lick, is a-expressing his or her affection-
ate feeling. And when you give a friend a hug or say “It’s so great to see you” 
or alternatively “I’m so glad to see you,” you a-express your joy at seeing your 
friend through an intentionally produced act (where some of the acts utilize 
sentences that in turn s-express propositions).
In general when one a-expresses a state of mind using a sentence, the sentence 
uttered retains its linguistic meaning. “It’s great to see you” and “I’m so glad to 
see you” each have their own meaning in virtue of the linguistic rules governing 
the lexical items and their respective modes of composition. Each s-expresses a 
certain proposition. What proposition? Well, setting aside some nuances about 
the context sensitivity of indexicals, it is most natural to say that the former sen-
tence expresses the proposition that it is great to see the addressee and the latter 
sentence expresses the proposition that the speaker is happy to see his or her 
addressee. It is because they express propositions that these sentences can par-
take in logical inferences and stand in systematic logico-semantic relations to 
other sentences (and in particular can be embedded in negation, conditionals, 
intensional contexts, etc.). For all that, we think that normal cases of producing 
unembedded tokens of these sentence types, in speech or in thought, are cases 
of one directly expressing one’s joy.
Intuitively, a-expression is more basic than s-expression. it is certainly more 
ubiquitous; nonhuman animals and prelinguistic children express states of 
mind through a variety of nonlinguistic means despite not having in their rep-
ertoires the ability to token sentences that s-express propositions. Now it may 
be that ultimately (in “the causal order of being”) s-expression has some (com-
plicated, to be sure) relation to a-expression. Perhaps, for example, the conven-
tional meanings of English sentences ultimately originate in Gricean speaker 
meanings that have “fossilized.”17 But once conventional meaning is in place, 
it is clear that we can separate what a given sentence s-expresses from what 
mental states speakers who use the sentence a-express on a given occasion or 
even regularly.18
Among linguistic creatures, a familiar acquisition process leads to the 
increasing use of more or less conventional means—both words and gestures—
to give vent to present states of mind (making a disapproving face, thinking out 
17. As suggested in Blackburn 1984, chap. 3. See also Bar-On 1995.
18. An analogous point can be made regarding thought tokens. Such tokens have semantic 
contents. So they too can be said to s-express propositions. (What the tokens s-express is 
something that an adequate [psycho]semantics will aim to specify.) But when a given thought 
token is produced,we can separate what the individual producing the token a-expresses from 
what the token s-expresses.
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loud, airing opinions, and so on). The distinction between expressive acts, on 
the one hand, and the expressive vehicles used in them, on the other, allows us 
to capture underlying action-theoretical similarities between expressing one’s 
annoyance through a gesture, an inarticulate sound, or a full sentence while still 
acknowledging significant differences.
Now, there is an intuitive contrast between acts of expressing states of mind 
and acts of merely telling about them. Anyone can say truly and some can even 
tell reliably that DB is feeling sad. But presumably only DB is in a position to 
express her sad feeling—for example, by letting tears roll down her cheeks or 
saying “This is so sad.” To use earlier terminology, we can say that when you say 
“DB is feeling sad” you are employing a sentence that s-expresses the proposi-
tion that DB is feeling sad, and if you are sincere, you are a-expressing your 
belief that DB is feeling sad, whereas DB’s tears s-express nothing, though in 
letting them roll down she a-expresses the sad feeling itself; and her utterance 
“This is so sad” s-expresses the proposition that something sad is happening, 
and she can use it to a-express her sadness.
What about DB’s avowal:  “I’m feeling so sad”? On the neo-expressivist 
view of avowals defended in Bar-On 2004, these are different from evidential 
reports on the presence and character of states of mind (whether others’ or 
our own) in that they are acts in which we a-express the very state that is 
attributed to us by the proposition that is s-expressed by the sentences we use. 
One of the central points of defending this idea was that it can help explain 
the epistemic asymmetry between avowals and third-person reports of the 
same states without compromising the semantic continuity between avowals 
and other statements. The asymmetry is not between types of sentences with 
certain semantic contents. Rather, the contrast in play here is between acts that 
directly express one’s mental state and reports of that state (whoever produces 
them and however reliably). (For notably the sentence “I am feeling sad” can 
be used by me as a mere evidential report of DB’s state, say, at the conclusion 
of a therapy session.)
For present purposes, what matters is that the distinction between 
s-expressing and a-expressing be recognized as a distinction that applies across 
all areas of discourse and regardless of what semantic, epistemological, or meta-
physical analysis we adopt for the relevant domain. On the view we advocate, 
mental states are indeed the relata of an expression relation. And it is a relation 
that may well be relevant for understanding of various linguistic acts we per-
form. But the relation in question is what we are calling a-expression. It is not 
the expression relation that holds between sentences and propositions or words 
and concepts (i.e., s-expression).
The relevance of this here is that we think the expressive character of ethical 
claims and their apparently tight connection to motivation can be explained 
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in partial analogy to the neo-expressivist treatment of avowals mentioned ear-
lier.19 According to avowal neo-expressivism, the epistemic asymmetry between 
avowals and (even self-)reports is due to the fact that in acts of avowing one 
gives direct vent to the very state that the sentence produced self-ascribes. 
Similarly, ethical neo-expressivism maintains that ethical sentences s-express 
straightforward propositions (which can be specified, at least initially, disquo-
tationally), and this allows us to preserve their semantic continuity with other 
sentences. However, what we might describe as the motivational asymmetry 
between ethical discourse and ordinary descriptive discourse can—on anal-
ogy to the epistemic asymmetry between avowals and reports—be captured 
(according to ethical neo-expressivism) by appeal to the expressive character of 
acts of making ethical claims.
So on our view expressivists have been correct to identify the expressive 
function of ethical discourse and reflection; if internalism is correct, then 
it is in fact part of the “job” of ethical claims (whether made in speech or in 
thought) to express certain of our motivational attitudes.20 Armed with the dis-
tinction between s-expression and a-expression, we think we can retain this 
key idea while avoiding a host of difficulties faced by traditional expressiv-
ism and later developments of it. As in the case of avowals, we can distinguish 
between the act of making an ethical claim and the vehicle used in making it. 
The vehicle used in claiming “Tormenting cats is morally wrong” is a sentence 
(or thought) token that employs an ethical term (or concept); the token can be 
said to s-express a true or false proposition. However, as with avowals, what 
is s-expressed by a claim does not settle even what mental state is character-
istically a-expressed by acts of making the claim let alone what mental state is 
a-expressed on a given occasion of producing the token. With Humeans, one 
may think that purely cognitive states (such as beliefs) cannot by themselves 
motivate or explain action, and furthermore one may think there is an intimate 
connection between sincerely making an ethical claim and being motivated to 
act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with it. The neo-expressivist main-
tains that in making ethical claims, we a-express the very same states whose 
presence is required for understanding the perceived motivational force of such 
claims.21 As Ayer already saw,22 this expressivist insight is best captured without 
19. Following Bar-On and Chrisman 2009.
20. Below we try to spell out how the neo-expressivist can respect the internalist take on this 
claim.
21. They do so whether or not they also express a belief whose content is given by the 
s-expressed proposition. For some discussion, see Bar-On and Chrisman 2009.
22. Ayer 1946, 104–108.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon May 26 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199347582.indd   234 5/26/2014   1:13:20 PM
(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View? 235
supposing that the vehicles used in making ethical claims s-express proposi-
tions that self-ascribe those states. (So it is important to note that we are not 
claiming that ethical claims are themselves avowals.)
Thus as long as we are talking about expressive acts, we can agree with Ayer 
that ethical claims betray or show motivational attitudes not because they report 
them23 but because those who make them (a-)express them directly. What the 
neo-expressivist goes on to add is that we need not endorse Ayer’s view that 
ethical claims are not truth evaluable, because they do not (s-)express any true 
or false propositions. According to ethical neo-expressivism, then
 (i) As a species of evaluative claims, ethical claims understood as acts are 
different from ordinary descriptive claims in that agents making them 
(in speech or in thought) a-express motivational attitudes.
 (ii) The vehicles used in making ethical claims—typically ethical 
sentences—are semantically continuous with ordinary descriptive 
sentences in being truth evaluable, embeddable in truth-functional 
as well as intensional contexts, logical inferences, and so on. This is 
because they s-express true or false propositions.
ETHICAL NEO-EXPRESSIVISM:    
ANTIREALISM, INTERNALISM
In the previous section we argued that the idea that ethical claims are distinc-
tive in that they express motivational attitudes can be captured without build-
ing attitude expression into the semantic content of ethical sentences. But doing 
so was of course supposed to allow expressivists to accommodate ethical anti-
realism and to capture motivational internalism. These were desiderata (a) and 
(b) from the end of the second section. How does a neo-expressivist view pro-
vide resources for satisfying them?
Re (a): Recall that above we distinguished propositions from truthconditions 
but said that propositions may determine the truthconditions of the sentences 
that express them. There is a pervasive tendency in metaethical debate to com-
bine this idea with a metaphysically inflated conception of truth and to interpret 
anyone who thinks a sentence expresses a proposition as committed to there 
being a way the world might be that would make this proposition true. While 
we recognize that many metaphysically inclined philosophers are attracted to 
23. And we might add, not even because they imply that one has them. (This in contrast with 
the implicature-style hybrid views in Copp 2001, 2009; Finlay 2005. For discussion of the 
contrast, see Bar-On and Chrisman 2009.)
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this picture, we deny that it is essential to the propositionalist framework for 
philosophical semantics. Notice that none of the reasons we gave earlier for 
assigning propositions to sentences as their semantic contents (translation, 
embedding, common content of diverse attitudes) trades on any particular 
conception of truth as correspondence with the world or of truthconditions 
as ways the world might be. In our view semantics is not the place to explain 
how reality is or might be, it is the place to systematize our understanding of 
things like sameness of meaning across different languages, commonalities of 
content under embeddings in force-stripping contexts, and the way sentences 
can articulate contents toward which diverse attitudes may be taken.
Because of this we want to allow that it makes sense to speak of an ethical 
sentence expressing a proposition prior to settling on the correct metaphys-
ics for ethical discourse. Thus we are assuming that it can make sense to 
assign, for example, “Tormenting the cat is wrong” the meaning that tor-
menting the cat is wrong, for logico-semantic purposes, independently of 
determining what, if anything, constitutes the nature or essence of moral 
wrongness (or torment or cats for that matter) or whether moral wrongness 
constitutes a metaphysically genuine property (natural or otherwise). The 
important point is just this: an expressivist can accept the sort of semantic 
conservatism we are here encouraging and still avoid any commitment to 
“spooky” irreducibly normative properties. Semantic conservatism is consis-
tent with ethical antirealism, since it implies nothing about the existence or 
nature of moral reality. Given this neutrality, it is left for further metaphysi-
cal investigation to determine whether there are ethical properties or states 
of affairs and, if there are, what their nature is and to what extent they are 
mind (or judgment) dependent.24
Some, however, will worry that the sort of semantic conservatism that we 
here encourage offers scant resources for explaining what sentences in a given 
area of discourse are about. To say that ethical sentences s-express “innocent” 
disquoted propositions is to offer a very thin notion of the sentences’ mean-
ings. If one wanted to understand what such sentences “really say” or what 
they are “really about,” then one would apparently have to beef up the account 
of the sentence’s s-expressed content. But then it is no longer possible to main-
tain the sort of semantic conservatism that we prefer—either one goes realist 
24. We are claiming that, in the ethical case (unlike in the avowal case; see Bar-On 2012), the 
possibility that there are no “truthmakers” for the relevant propositions should be left open 
to allow for a meaningful dispute between ethical realists and antirealists who can agree 
on the availability of a disquotationally specified proposition as a semantic starting point. 
(Note that to say this is not to commit to a disquotational theory of the truth of ethical—or 
other—claims.)
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or one goes traditional expressivist, or subjectivist, or whatever. Or so the 
objection might go.25
In response we would begin by pointing out that, as far as the semantics of 
ethical sentences is concerned, it is not as if all we can say is that they s-express 
“innocent” disqouted propositions. As explained earlier, there is still plenty of 
interesting work left for the semanticist to do: arguably she ought to explain 
how the proposition expressed by an ethical sentence is a systematic function 
of the semantic values of the parts of the sentence, how these are composed in 
its logical form, and so forth. She can seek systematic integration of that piece 
of her semantics with other pieces, such as her view about embedding in indica-
tive conditionals, under epistemic modals, or in propositional attitude reports. 
She can posit covert context sensitivity or deny it. She can debate the logical 
form of the sentence and ones syntactically like it. What she cannot do, how-
ever—without abandoning the sort of ontological innocence that we would like 
to maintain—is to say what in reality the sentence is about. Our view, however, 
is that the thought that a propositionalist semantics carries specific ontological 
commitments is a significant step beyond the truth-conditionalist framework 
that has proven so fruitful in compositional semantics.
We join Simon Blackburn (1998, 79) in thinking that “the ethical proposition 
is what it is and not another thing.”26 If we understand him correctly, his point is 
just that when asked what a sentence like “Tormenting the cat is wrong” is really 
about, one should simply say that it is about tormenting the cat being wrong. To 
say anything further would be to risk running afoul of the open question argu-
ment and/or queerness worries. Taking such a conservative approach to the 
semantics of ethical sentences allows us to capture all the virtues of traditional 
propositional-compositional semantics while remaining totally silent on the 
appropriate metaphysics for ethical claims.27 And it is this silence that allows us 
to accommodate ethical antirealism.
Perhaps a further thing to say in response to this objection would be to ques-
tion how coherent it ever was to ask what sentences in a given area of discourse 
are about. In particular we wonder what sense can be made of the notion of 
“sentences in a given area of discourse,” especially when it is noted that such 
sentences can typically be embedded rather easily into force-stripping contexts, 
25. Richard forthcoming provides reasons for expecting semantics to yield assignments of 
meaning that go beyond “innocent” propositions.
26. Blackburn here adapts a famous line from Joseph Butler via G.  E. Moore (1993, 
29): “Everything is what it is, and not another thing.”
27. This is an instance of the sort of problem Price (2004) refers to as “placement problems.” 
See also Price 2013, chap. 1,sec. 4, for a helpful discussion of the origin of these problems 
and how to diffuse them.
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some of which will be logically complex sentences with “mixed” parts—that 
is, parts of which belong in the supposed domain and parts that do not. For 
instance, “If he φ-ed, then he ought to be punished” seems like a sentence 
belonging to the domain of ethics, but what about “If he ought to be punished, 
then he φ-ed”? And what about sentences like “It’s either morally wrong to φ 
or it isn’t”? Such possibilities and the ease with which they are entertained may 
tell against the very notion of a given domain. And if sufficient sense cannot be 
made of this notion, then it would appear as if all that remains are particular 
meanings of particular sentences to be determined lexically and composition-
ally—an outcome with which we are perfectly comfortable.
Furthermore, our semantic conservatism allows us to remain neutral on the 
nature of the attitude expressed when making ethical claims. Any number of 
attitudes can do as long as it can be argued that the relevant attitude is suitably 
linked to motivation (a matter left to moral psychology). Again, we see it as an 
advantage of our view that it is not forced to settle in the semantics of ethical 
discourse what attitudes agents express when employing ethical vocabulary.28
Some may wonder, however: even if ethical neo-expressivism does not owe 
us an account of the states expressed when making ethical claims, does it not 
owe us an account of the connection between these states and ethical claims 
understood as products? After all, in the case of avowals the connection seems 
pretty straightforward: the sentence typically explicitly mentions the very state 
that is a-expressed. So what accounts for the connection between a sentence 
like “Tormenting the cat is wrong” and, say, disapproval if the latter does not 
figure into the semantic content of the former?
Here again, there are two things to say. First, it is a mistake to think that 
the connection between mental states and avowals is simply a matter of the 
sentences typically explicitly mentioning the relevant states. Consider two sen-
tences from our earlier discussion of a-expression:
(1) “It’s so great to see you!”
(2) “I’m so glad to see you!”
As we explained before, these sentences can be used as vehicles for the 
a-expression of one and the same mental state—being glad or feeling joy. 
However, if we were to explain the connection between the sentence and the 
mental state in (2) in terms of the sentence explicitly mentioning the relevant 
state, we would apparently have to tell some other kind of story about how the 
same connection is forged in (1). Instead, we think this connection is forged in 
28. This problem has been called “the specification problem” for expressivism. See Björnsson 
and McPherson forthcoming; Köhler 2013.
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the same way for both (1) and (2) as well as for other vehicles for the a-expression 
of being glad, such as a hug. We prefer to account for this connection by mak-
ing reference to the conditions underlying competence with the use of expres-
sive vehicles in performing relevant types of expressive acts. In the case of both 
(1) and (2), for instance, competence with the sentence requires a speaker to 
know that they are fit vehicles with which to a-express being glad, feeling joy, 
and the like. The same goes for acts such as hugging. (With a little imagina-
tion, the reader could envision various cases of misplaced, poorly timed, or 
otherwise inappropriate hugs and ask what sorts of conclusions we would draw 
about the hugger’s competence.)29 Explicitly mentioning the relevant state is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing, mastering, or preserving the 
expressive link to it in an expressive vehicle.30
Second, going back to the question of how ethical claims in particular come 
to be linked to certain motivational states, we think it instructive to consider 
the case of slurs and other “linguistic expressives,” since these too are terms 
(or phrases) with a clear connection to certain mental states (though, unlike 
avowals, the connection is not explicit). One can a-express anger toward John 
by saying “I’m angry with John!” or by saying “John is such an a-hole!” Here 
again, one of the sentences “s”-names the relevant attitude, but both are obvi-
ously effective (and common) as expressive vehicles for one’s anger. And this is 
because competence with the term “a-hole” requires implicit knowledge that 
it is a fit vehicle with which to a-express anger (or related sentiment). To this 
extent, we agree with hybrid expressivists who think that, for example, pejo-
ratives and slurs nicely illustrate how terms and sentences can be bound up 
with certain noncognitive attitudes, despite bearing no explicit connection to 
the relevant states.31 Where we part ways, however, is in our denial that the 
noncognitive attitudes somehow figure into the semantic contents of expressive 
terms or of the sentences containing them. Though there may be much to be 
said about the state of mind characteristically (a-)expressed by (proper) uses of 
“a-hole” (and though there may be interesting things to say about what makes 
29. See Bar-On 2004, 320ff., 419ff., for relevant discussion of what she calls “expressive fail-
ures,” which can arise even in the case of inadvertent expressive behaviors, such as yelps or 
grimaces.
30. That it is not sufficient can be clearly seen from the fact that mental states are regularly 
named in sentences that are not used in acts of (a-)expressing them.
31. One finds references to slurs throughout the literature on hybrid expressivism, as many 
think they nicely embody the basic point of hybrid theories. David Copp (2009, 169–170), 
for instance, writes that ethical terms “are similar to pejorative terms in that their use can 
both ascribe a property and express a relevant conative attitude.” See also Boisvert 2008; Hay 
2013; Schroeder 2013.
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it the case that someone is an a-hole), “John is an a-hole!” can still be said to 
s-express the proposition that, well, John is an a-hole. (And it is in virtue of this 
that the sentence can be embedded in a variety of contexts, partake in logical 
inferences, etc.)32
Re (b): According to internalists, one who makes a claim such as “Charity 
is good” competently cannot be completely indifferent to charity, whereas one 
who makes the grammatically similar claim “Charity is common” can. There 
is little consensus, even among self-avowed internalists, about the character of 
the “cannot be” here, but we would still like to outline briefly how our view can 
accommodate an internal connection. No doubt there will be internalists who 
deem the connection insufficiently tight. But it is far from clear that any tighter 
connection is defensible.33
Earlier we mentioned the neo-expressivist explanation of the epistemic 
asymmetry between avowals and evidential reports: someone who is avowing 
feeling annoyed—as opposed to reporting annoyance in consequence of, say, 
therapy—is taken to engage in an act of direct expression of annoyance (and 
not simply expressing the belief that she or he is annoyed). Though it is not 
conceptually impossible for someone to make a mental self-ascription and not 
be in the self-ascribed state, it is a propriety condition on avowing that one is in 
the self-ascribed mental state. The neo-expressivist explanation of the motiva-
tional asymmetry between ethical claims and descriptive claims can be seen as 
analogous. Someone who is making an ethical claim (as opposed to producing 
a descriptive report of some state of affairs) is a-expressing the relevant moti-
vational attitude—the very attitude whose presence would explain why she or 
he is suitably motivated. Even if it is not conceptually impossible for someone 
to make an ethical claim without having the relevant attitude, having the atti-
tude can still be a propriety condition on making (genuinely) ethical claims. So 
someone who makes the claim while lacking the attitude violates a propriety 
condition on acts of ethical claim making. And adequate mastery of ethical dis-
course and ethical concepts requires grasping this propriety condition.34 This 
arguably provides resources for capturing a fairly strong internal connection 
32. Note that in the case of linguistic expressives it may be plausible to suggest that, e.g.,“John 
is such an a-hole” is more or less synonymous with “What an a-hole!” (applied to John). Yet 
the former can—but the latter cannot—be embedded in a conditional, or serve as a premise 
in an instance of modus ponens, and so on.
33. See Björnsson and France ғn Olinder 2013 and Fletcher unpublished for critiques of stron-
ger forms of internalism. See Björklund et  al. 2012 and Fletcher unpublished for helpful 
discussion of the many different forms and strengths of internalism and its dialectical role 
in metaethical debate.
34. Again, thinking of slurs and other linguistic expressives is instructive here.
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between ethical claims and action as well as providing a more nuanced array 
of diagnoses of different ways the connection between making an (apparently) 
ethical claim and motivation can be broken.35
Propriety conditions lay down norms for what counts as doing things prop-
erly. For example, a propriety condition on making promises may be that one 
has an intention to do as the promise says. This means that if one has made a 
promise without having the relevant intention, one has failed to properly issue 
a promise. Note that improperly making a promise is not the same as not mak-
ing a promise at all. An actor on stage who says “I promise” is only making a 
pretend promise; a parrot or a not-yet-competent speaker who utters the words 
is making no promise at all rather than pretending to. Does this mean that it 
is conceptually impossible for one to say “I promise” meaningfully without hav-
ing the relevant intention? Of course not, since it is possible to say “I promise” 
insincerely. But notice that we are willing to credit the insincere speaker with 
understanding of and semantic competence with the relevant term despite her 
failing to have the requisite intention. What licenses this? It is the fact that we 
have some independent grounds for crediting her with this receptive and pro-
ductive competence. (Indeed such competence must feature in the explanation 
of her insincere performance.) But now suppose we have a speaker who is not 
insincere; she says “I promise” but fails to have the relevant intention—perhaps 
due to some temporary or chronic psychological feebleness. Still, we may have 
reason to credit her with competence. For example, she may exhibit full aware-
ness of the propriety conditions on the practice of promising; she just fails to 
meet them. Of such a speaker, we would want to say that she has made a prom-
ise, albeit an improper one.
In the ethical case we are similarly inclined to say that it ought to be con-
ceptually possible to have a speaker (or thinker) who has achieved competence 
with ethical vocabulary but who makes an ethical claim while still failing to have 
the relevant attitude. This, however, does not commit us to saying that one can 
achieve competence with the ethical vocabulary without grasping the propriety 
condition mentioned earlier. Moreover, suppose we come across a whole com-
munity whose speakers appear to use ethical vocabulary but who never have 
the appropriate attitudes. Given semantic conservatism, we should allow that 
the sentences used by members of this community may have the same prop-
ositional contents as our ethical sentences. But this does not settle the ques-
tion whether they are actually making ethical claims (ever). If their discourse 
is governed by entirely different propriety conditions, then it is not ethical dis-
course. Compare: If in some twin community there is no connection whatsoever 
35. For further discussion, see Bar-On and Chrisman 2009, 143–150.
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between the use of a type of sentence and trying to amuse/being amused, that 
tells against interpreting the use of that type of sentence as “telling a joke.” Still, 
this would not be reflected in the translation of individual jokes. What makes an 
utterance an act of making a joke (involvement in a practice governed by certain 
norms) need not be read off the meaning of individual sentences used as jokes. 
Similarly, we want to say, what makes a claim an ethical claim need not be read 
off the meaning of individual sentences used as ethical claims.
An analogy may be helpful here. Suppose I am playing a game of chess, and 
I move the rook diagonally. We might say either that I have made an improper 
chess move or that I have not made a chess move at all. There is good reason to 
say the former. To “make a chess move” is just to make a move while engaged in 
a certain sort of practice, which is itself governed by rules. This is the difference 
between you moving the rook diagonally while playing a game of chess and 
say, a one-year-old child grabbing a rook and moving it elsewhere on the board 
(even if perfectly in line with the rules). The child is not playing chess; you are. 
Similarly, the psychopath, when he confesses that he behaved wrongly—despite 
not feeling guilty, regretting his actions, and so forth—is still making an ethical 
claim, though he makes his claim improperly. Genuinely making ethical claims 
is to be contrasted with things like using moral/evaluative language while act-
ing. Regardless of whether the actor on stage has the relevant attitudes, she 
is not making a genuinely ethical claim—she is just pretending to engage in 
ethical discourse. Similarly for using moral/evaluative language sarcastically, 
playfully, and so forth. For example, saying sarcastically “Good job, Ryan!” or 
saying playfully “You’re so bad.” These are not cases of people using the language 
improperly but rather cases of not making any genuine ethical claims at all. By 
contrast, it does not seem plausible to think that Ted Bundy was pretending to 
make ethical claims, nor was he using the language playfully or sarcastically. As 
far as he was concerned, he was just as engaged in the practice of moral evalu-
ation as we are when we morally judge his behavior—and so we would perhaps 
affirm that he is making an ethical claim. But on the assumption that Bundy felt 
no remorse (etc.) at all, he was nonetheless doing so improperly.36
CONCLUSION:  NEO-EXPRESSIVISM  
AND HYBRID EXPRESSIVISM?
Protoexpressivism flounders on the challenge of developing a systematic 
account of the meaning of arbitrary sentences out of the essentially bifurcated 
36. Note that Bundy’s case could be assimilated to the “deviant community” case if there 
were reasons to think he simply has not cottoned on to the propriety conditions of ethical 
discourse. It depends on the case.
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thought that ethical sentences express noncognitive attitudes while nonethical 
sentences express propositions. The response to this challenge from mainline 
expressivists of the 1960s through the 1990s was to suggest that the meaning of 
all sentences is to be given in terms of the attitudes they express; it is just that 
descriptive and ethical sentences express importantly different kinds of atti-
tudes: beliefs versus desires (or other motivational states). As we mentioned 
at the outset, more recent “hybrid theorists” have suggested that this approach 
still faces a number of difficulties stemming from the semantic continuities 
between descriptive and ethical sentences, and these might be overcome by 
suggesting that although the meaning of all sentences is to be given in terms of 
the attitudes they express, ethical sentences express a distinctive hybrid attitude 
constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements. Roughly speaking, the 
belief-like attitude is supposed to capture the semantic continuities between 
ethical sentences and descriptive sentences, while the desire-like attitude is sup-
posed to retain the original benefits of mainline expressivism.
In light of this it is worth asking, is the neo-expressivist view we have been 
discussing here a “hybrid” view? It might seem that way, since on the face of 
it we maintain that when someone makes an ethical claim (in speech or in 
thought) two different things get expressed:  a proposition and the speaker’s 
or the thinker’s motivational attitude. But as should by now be clear, this is 
misleading, since on our view the two things are expressed in two different 
senses—the proposition is s-expressed by the relevant sentence (or thought) 
token, whereas the motivational attitude is a-expressed by the individual mak-
ing the claim. Importantly, in sharp distinction from other hybrid views, we 
do not maintain that the “two things” constitute two parts of the meaning of 
ethical sentences. Nor do we locate the attitude expression in a conventionally 
implicated or conversationally inferable proposition that self-ascribes the atti-
tude, as do implicature views.37 Thus rather than pursuing a nonconservative 
semantics for ethical sentences and then hybridizing the mental state said to be 
semantically expressed by ethical sentences, ethical neo-expressivism proposes 
that we use the more basic and less controversial distinction between what sen-
tences express (i.e., propositions) and what people express (i.e., mental states) 
to capture the internalist intuitions but in a way that allows us to remain neutral 
on the metaphysical issue of realism as well as on the moral psychological issue 
of cognitivism.
The notion of a-expression seems more general and more basic than any 
of the following:  (i)  semantically expressing a proposition; (ii) semantically 
expressing a mental state; (iii) stating, implicating, or otherwise conveying the 
37. See Copp 2001, 2009; Finlay 2004, 2005. Bar-On and Chrisman 2009, 150–158, compares 
and contrasts ethical neo-expressivism with these implicature views.
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proposition that one is in a particular mental state. This is why we think it is 
the appropriate place to look to explain the supposedly distinctive way ethical 
claims express attitudes. Moreover, we take the notion of s-expression to estab-
lish a framework for thinking about semantic content within the constraints 
of compositionality and the semantic competence of speakers. However, it 
is a framework that we take to be attractively neutral on metaphysical and 
moral-psychological issues, which is why we think it is preferable for anyone 
seeking to accommodate ethical antirealism and to capture motivational inter-
nalism. This is why neo-expressivism offers a nice way to retain one of the core 
insights of traditional expressivism (that acts of making an ethical claim “have 
the job” of expressing attitudes distinctively connected to motivation) while 
avoiding one of the main pitfalls of many later versions of expressivism (result-
ing from abandoning propositionalist explanations of the semantic content of 
ethical sentences). We close by responding to three potential worries.
The first worry is that neo-expressivism does not meet desiderata (a)  and 
(b)  from the second section (avoiding spooky facts and accommodating the 
internal connection to motivation) in the semantics of ethical sentences and it 
does not meet them in the pragmatics of ethical discourse, so it is unclear what 
part of the view of ethical language does allow us to meet them. Our answer to 
this is that these desiderata should be met in the theory of ethical claim making, 
including the propriety conditions on such acts. We are suggesting that there 
is a particular kind of act (both in public speech and in private thought) whose 
propriety is linked to having certain motivational dispositions, and this link is 
what explains whatever distinctive internal connection there is between ethical 
claims and motivation.
The second worry can be presented as a critical question from hybrid 
expressivists like Michael Ridge who think our view is not so different from 
theirs: “Even if you do not want to endorse it as your ‘semantics’ of ethical 
sentences, are you not also committed to hybridizing not only the expres-
sion relation but also the mental state expressed (you will say “a-expressed”) 
by ethical claims? To capture their psychological continuity with other 
claims, you will have to say that ethical claims a-express beliefs, but to cap-
ture the difference in their motivational potentials, you will have to say 
that they also a-express motivational attitudes.” Our response is that ethi-
cal neo-expressivism itself is neutral on the psychology of motivation and 
on the extent to which ethical thoughts are psychologically continuous with 
other kinds of thoughts. It is open to us to say ethical claims a-express beliefs 
with ethical content, which as a matter of their psychological nature have 
a distinctive motivational capacity compared to other sorts of belief, but 
we can also say that, in light of the Humean distinction between cognitive 
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and conative attitudes in the psychology of motivation, acts of making ethi-
cal claims a-express both. Although ethical neo-expressivism was origi-
nally framed against the background of this Humean distinction, which is 
a key tenet of many forms of expressivism, the view is also compatible with 
anti-Humean accounts of motivation.
A final worry concerns ethical claims made in thought rather than in speech. 
Many find mysterious the idea that inner thoughts are subject to propriety 
conditions about what mental state one should be in—for how would those 
propriety conditions get enforced, where would they come from, and what evi-
dence could there be of their existence? In response we would stress that our 
view is that it is part of what it is to make an ethical claim, whether in speech 
or in thought, that one has done so inappropriately if one is not in the relevant 
motivational state. This “comes from” the point and function of a practice of 
ethical claim making. Although the rules of that practice may be most easily 
enforced when it is public, we see no reason that these rules could not be inter-
nalized and be thought to govern “silent” acts of ethical claim making. We take 
this to be a mundane phenomenon illustrated by other cases of expressing in 
thought, such as making promises to oneself (or to God), avowing, or using 
various expressives. Thus all in all we think understanding the sense in which 
ethical claims express motivational states along our proposed neo-expressivist 
lines should allow expressivists to meet some of the main desiderata that origi-
nally motivated expressivists while avoiding the main difficulties besetting 
traditional expressivism and its heirs and while maintaining neutrality on key 
debatable issues.
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